俄羅斯最艱鉅的挑戰 寡頭能拯救俄羅斯嗎
Twenty years ago, asmall group of Russian businessmen saved the country from a return tocommunism.
20年前，一小羣俄羅斯商人拯救了這個國家，使之避免回到共產黨統治。
Boris Yeltsin,physically and politically weak, was close to being beaten in the presidentialelection by Gennady Zyuganov.
在總統選舉中，身體和政治上虛弱的鮑里斯.葉利欽(Boris Yeltsin)差點被根納季.久加諾夫（Gennady Zyuganov，俄羅斯聯邦共產黨領導人——譯者注）打敗。
In the firstballot, Yeltsin led by just 3 per cent.
在第一輪投票中，葉利欽領先3個百分點。
The moneyand organisation the oligarchs brought to the party put him more than 13points ahead in the second and decisive vote.
在第二輪決定性的投票中，寡頭們提供的資金和組織使他領先了逾13個百分點。
Now, in verydifferent circumstances, the oligarchs may need to intervene again.
如今，在非常不同的時代背景下，寡頭們或許需要再次干預。
Russia is in aparlous state.
俄羅斯目前正處於危險之中。
Real incomes havefallen by 10 per cent in just a year.
實際收入在短短一年裏下滑了10%。
The roubledepreciated 37 per cent and in real terms gross domestic product fell 3.7 percent, according to World Bank figures.
盧布下跌了37%；根據世界銀行(World Bank)數據，實際國內生產總值(GDP)縮水3.7%。
Household incomesand investment fell sharply.
家庭收入和投資急劇下滑。
The trends havepersisted into 2016.
這種趨勢延續到了2016年。
Forget the blusterof President Vladimir Putin and the military activities in Ukraine and Syria.
忘了俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾.普京(Vladimir Putin)的狠話以及在烏克蘭和敘利亞的軍事活動吧。
What was once asuperpower is now a country in decline.
昔日的超級大國現在成了衰落之國。
Many nations havesuffered from the fall in energy prices over the last two years but few havebeen more seriously affected than Russia.
過去兩年，很多國家都遭受了能源價格下跌的影響，但是沒有幾個國家比俄羅斯受到的打擊更嚴重。
The reason is itsoverwhelming dependence on the oil and gas sector, revenues from which accountfor half the national budget.
原因在於它對石油和天然氣部門壓倒性的依賴，來自該部門的財政收入支撐了國家預算的一半。
The effect of thefall in oil prices has been compounded by the loss of both volumes and value ingas sales.
除油價下滑的影響外，天然氣銷售規模縮減和價格下跌如同雪上加霜。
Europe is Russia’sprimary export market and falling gas demand (down 20 per cent over the lastdecade) combined with a worldwide surplus of supply has pushed prices down 65per cent in the last three years.
歐洲是俄羅斯主要的出口市場，天然氣需求下滑（過去十年減少了20%）再加上全球範圍供應過剩，使得過去三年天然氣價格下降了65%。
To these exogenousfactors have been added the isolation and sanctions that have followed theannexation of Crimea.
除這些外部因素外，還有俄羅斯吞併克里米亞後遭到的孤立和制裁。
Such measures maynot have led to any reconsideration of policy in the Kremlin but they have hadan inexorably growing negative effect on the economy.
此類措施或許並沒有促使克里姆林宮重審政策，但是它們對俄羅斯經濟造成了日益消極的影響。
Fresh inwardinvestment is minimal, and in the areas of new technology that Russia so badlyneeds it is nonexistent.
新的外來投資極少，而在俄羅斯亟需的新技術領域完全不存在。
The internationalcompanies already present are keeping their heads down, hoping circumstanceswill change.
已經落地的跨國企業保持低姿態，企盼形勢會有所改變。
But they are notrushing to put in more money.
但是它們不急於加大投資。
Mr Putin, who hasremained in power for most of the last 17 years on the back of relativelystrong oil and gas prices, can now only rely on the dangerous rhetoric ofnationalism, coupled with a determination to make convenient enemies of thewest, in particular the US.
在油價和天然氣價格相對堅挺的幫助下，在過去17年的大部分時間掌握大權的普京，如今只能依賴於危險的民族主義言論、以及把西方（特別是美國）列爲便利的敵對力量的決心。
The vicious andunnecessary conflict in Syria serves no practical purpose.
在敘利亞延續毫無必要的惡性衝突沒有實際作用。
Russian interests,including its naval base on the Mediterranean coast of Syria, could easily havebeen protected within the terms of a peace agreement.
俄羅斯的利益——包括其在敘利亞地中海海岸的海軍基地——可以在和平協議的條款下輕鬆得到保護。
But Mr Putin needsa continuing conflict to justify his position of power.
但是普京需要延續敘利亞的衝突來坐穩自己的權力寶座。
Why should theoligarchs take the risk of forcing a change in the Kremlin? The answer isself-interest — just as in 1996.
寡頭們爲何要冒險迫使克里姆林宮換人？答案是爲了自身利益——就像1996年一樣。
Several have lostlarge sums of money as the economy has declined.
隨着俄羅斯經濟下滑，一些寡頭已經遭受了大量財富損失。
Although most havemanaged to extract their families and the bulk of their capital and moved toLondon or Paris, many still have substantial physical and economic assets inRussia.
儘管多數寡頭成功地把家人和大部分資本轉移至倫敦或巴黎，但是很多人在俄羅斯仍然擁有大量的實體和經濟資產。
Those arevulnerable to a collapse of confidence in the economy and potentialexpropriation by a desperate government.
這些資產容易受到經濟信心崩塌的影響，也可能會被走投無路的政府沒收。
Some even fear thelong arm of Moscow will reach out to force them to hand back some of the moneythey have taken out.
一些人甚至擔心莫斯科方面的觸角會伸向境外，強迫他們返還已經轉移的一部分資金。
For many there isa reputational concern.
很多寡頭還有名譽上的顧慮。
To be Russian isnot a label that secures trust or warm acceptance.
身爲俄羅斯人的標籤無助於得到信任或熱情接受。
Some doors havealready been closed to investment from the country.
來自俄羅斯的投資已經吃了一些閉門羹。
In the second USpresidential debate last week, Hillary Clinton talked about the need to findmore leverage to force Moscow to change its behaviour.
在美國總統競選第二場辯論中，希拉里.克林頓(Hillary Clinton)談到了尋找更多手段強迫莫斯科改變的必要性。
That can only beeconomic in nature and would directly affect the oligarchs and their businessinterests including, in extremis, their right to travel freely in the US.
這些手段的性質只可能是經濟的，它們會直接影響寡頭及其商業利益，在極端情況下還包括他們在美國自由旅行的權利。
As American robberbarons learnt at the end of the 19th century, once you have made your money –by whatever means – you have a keen interest in the enforcement of the rule oflaw to protect your assets.
就像美國強盜資本家在19世紀末學到的那樣，一旦你賺了錢——無論以何種方式——你就會對維護法治有強烈興趣，以保護你的資產。
The understandingreached more than a decade ago between the oligarchs and Mr Putin after initialtension which saw some arrested or exiled was that he would make Russia asecure place in and from which to do business and that the oligarchs would stayout of politics and sustain him in power.
十多年前，寡頭們和普京之間在經歷了最初的緊張後（一些人被逮捕或流放）達成共識：普京會確保俄羅斯成爲做生意的安全之地，而寡頭們會遠離政治並支撐他掌權。
The president hasbroken his side of that bargain.
現在普京背棄了他在那筆交易下的義務。
What would achange of leadership mean? In essence, a change of priorities.
領導層變更將意味着什麼？在本質上，這意味着改變輕重緩急。
Economics wouldbecome more important than military adventures or any conflict with Europe orthe US.
經濟會比軍事冒險或與歐美衝突更受重視。
Deals would bedone to settle the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria to bring an end to sanctions.
簽訂解決烏克蘭和敘利亞衝突的協議，結束制裁。
The neglectedagenda of establishing closer links with Europe would be revived.
重啓近年被忽視的與歐洲建立更緊密關係的議程。
Changing Russiainternally would be the greatest challenge.
從內部改變俄羅斯將是最艱鉅的挑戰。
A technocrat wouldbe put in charge.
將有一名技術統治論者掌權。
The securityapparatus of the state would remain in place – the oligarchs are too smart tomess with the FSB, the KGB’s successor agency – but there would be a reductionin military spending and procurement which has risen rapidly in the last threeyears.
國家的安全機器將繼續保留——精明的寡頭們不會插手俄羅斯聯邦安全局（FSB，前身是蘇聯克格勃(KGB)）的事務——但是軍事支出和裝備採購將縮減（過去三年這方面的支出迅速增長）。
There wouldinstead be incentives for inward investment, helped by the weakness of therouble and the promise of a more more economically and politically stablegovernment in Moscow.
同時，俄羅斯將在疲軟盧布和承諾建立在經濟和政治上更穩定的政府的幫助下推出吸引外資的刺激政策。
On top of that, anew wave of privatisation could begin.
此外，俄羅斯將開始新一輪私有化浪潮。
No doubt theoligarchs would participate by bringing back some of the capital they haveexported.
寡頭們必然會參與其中，將之前外流的部分資金轉移回國內。
Russia would notsuddenly become an open, liberal democracy but the dangerous illusion that itis still a superpower would be quietly dropped and the world would be a saferplace.
俄羅斯不會在一夜間變成開放、自由的民主國家，但是它會默默放下自己仍是超級大國的危險幻覺，世界將變得更加安全。
Given the scale ofthe country’s problems and the risks of the current tensions escalating, animperfect transfer of power would be better than allowing the status quo todeteriorate further.
鑑於俄羅斯問題的嚴重性以及當前緊張局勢升級的風險，不完美的權力移交也好過現狀進一步惡化。
