英國退歐是經濟長期低迷的結果

When it became clear that the British really had voted to leave the EU, markets around the world dropped to the floor and began twitching. One couldn’t help but be reminded of the collapse of Lehman Brothers almost eight years ago, but perhaps the Brexit vote isn’t so much an echo of Lehman Brothers as a sequel in a long story of economic disappointment.

當事情逐漸明朗化，英國人在公投中真的選擇離開歐盟的時候，世界各地的市場暴跌至歷史低點，並開始震盪。人們不禁想起了近8年前雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破產的情形，但與其說英國退歐公投是雷曼事件的再現，還不如說是經濟長期以來令人失望的結果。

The 2008 financial crisis shaped the rhetoric of the Brexit debate, of course. Had this vote taken place 10 years ago, the fact that most economists thought that leaving would be an act of awful self-harm would have carried weight. The prospect of investment banks moving their activities to Dublin and Frankfurt would have seemed like a disadvantage, not a two-for-one offer.

當然，2008年金融危機塑造了英國退歐辯論中的言辭。如果這場公投發生在十年前，大多數經濟學家認爲退歐是一種可怕自殘行爲的論斷肯定會很有分量。投行將業務活動遷到都柏林和法蘭克福的前景看起來將是不利的，而不是超級划算。

There is a good argument that, despite the crisis, both economists and banks have something useful to contribute, but that case was never likely to be heard. It was too much to expect a subtle and well-reasoned public debate on the risks and contributions of London as an international banking centre. The most prominent claim of the Leave side — that the UK spends ￡350m a week on EU membership and could spend that on the National Health Service instead — sailed untouched through the campaigning, despite being simply false.

一個合理的觀點是，儘管爆發了金融危機，但經濟學家和銀行都能夠做出有益的貢獻，只不過人們絕不可能聽進去這種觀點。指望公衆就倫敦作爲國際銀行業中心的風險和貢獻展開微妙而理性的辯論實在有些勉強。退歐陣營最引人注目的主張是，英國每週爲歐盟成員國身份支出3.5億英鎊，如果退出歐盟就可以把這筆錢投入到英國國民醫保體系(NHS)中——雖然這種說法是錯誤的，但它依然在整個公投期間盛行。

But some of the seeds of this vote have been Growing for much longer in the fertile soil of economic grievance. The UK, like every other major developed economy inside or outside the EU, was growing more quickly per capita before 1973 than afterwards. Slow growth has been the norm across the G7 for four decades. It has been exacerbated in anglophone countries by a sharp increase in top-income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s, which has meant that the benefits of even this modest growth have not been widely felt.

但這次公投的一些種子在充斥着對經濟的不滿情緒的土壤裏生長的時間要長得多。與歐盟內外的其他主要發達經濟體一樣，英國人均GDP水平在1973年之前比之後發展得快得多。40年來，增長緩慢是7國集團(G7)的常態。在講英語國家，這一問題因上世紀八、九十年代收入不平等程度急劇上升而惡化——不平等程度加劇意味着，即便經濟溫和增長，其益處並未被大衆感受到。

And so we see a desire to upend the status quo: Brexit, of course, but also the rise of radical politicians from Marine Le Pen in France, Donald Trump in the US and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands on the right, to Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, Trump’s opponent Bernie Sanders and Alexis Tsipras in Greece on the left.

因此我們看到有人想要顛覆現狀：退歐，當然還有激進政客的崛起，從法國的馬琳•勒龐(Marine Le Pen)、美國的唐納德•特朗普(Donald Trump)和荷蘭的海爾特•威爾德斯(Geert Wilders)這些右翼人士，到英國的傑里米•科爾賓(Jeremy Corbyn)、特朗普的對手伯尼•桑德斯(Bernie Sanders)以及希臘的亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)這些左翼人士。

But perhaps there are deeper forces too. In 2005, the Harvard University economist Benjamin Friedman published The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, arguing that times of broad-based economic progress also tended to lead to moral progress, to “greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, commitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy”. Reverse the economic gains and the moral gains may also evaporate.

但或許還有更深層次的影響因素。2005年，哈佛大學(Harvard University)經濟學家本傑明•弗裏德曼(Benjamin Friedman)發表了《經濟增長的道德後果》(The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth)一書。他在書中辯稱，當大多數人都感受到經濟發展的時候，往往也會導致道德的進步，導致“機遇增加、包容多樣性、社會流動順暢、更願意維護公平和擁護民主”，相反，如果經濟停滯，道德也不會有什麼進步。

Friedman argues that we naturally compare ourselves to others. We can compare ourselves to TV celebrities (a recipe for misery, since they are all richer, more famous and better looking than we are) or, as per the platitude, to “those less fortunate than ourselves”.

弗裏德曼辯稱，我們天生要與他人比較。我們可能與電視明星相比（這是痛苦的來源，因爲他們全都比我們更富有、更出名，長得也更好看），或者像老生常談的那樣，和那些不如我們幸運的人相比。

But, usually, we make one of two simpler comparisons. We can feel happy because we’re doing better than we were last year, or we can feel happy because we’re doing better than our neighbours. In good times, everyone can feel happy for the first reason, but not everyone can feel happy for the second.

但我們通常會進行兩種更簡單的比較。我們可能感到幸福，是因爲我們比去年幹得好，或者我們感到幸福是因爲我們比鄰居幹得好。在年景好的時候，所有人都因第一個原因而感到幸福，但並非所有人都因第二個原因感到幸福。

When prosperity is broad-based and growing, it’s cheering to look back at how far we have come. We can relax, knowing that we’re earning twice the salary, that we own a larger home, that there are savings and a pension. But in bad times there is little solace to be had by thinking about the past. All we recall is that our younger selves had hair, muscle tone and, above all, a bright future — each of which time has taken away from us.

當我們大多數人都感到日子越來越好的時候，回過頭看看我們取得了多大成就會令人振奮。我們可能感到放鬆，知道我們的薪水是以前的兩倍，我們的房子也更大，而且還有儲蓄和養老金。但在年景不好的時候，回顧過去沒有什麼慰藉。我們能夠回憶的只是更年輕的自己頭髮茂盛，肌肉結實，而且最重要的是有光明的未來——所有這些時期都離我們遠去。

And so in tough times we resort to the other comparison available to us: are we doing better than our neighbours? When we stop admiring how much the pie has grown, we start fighting each other for a larger slice. Many people who voted to leave did not see EU membership as a joint project for mutual benefit but as a zero-sum game that Britain was losing and Brussels was winning.

因此在艱難時日，我們會尋找其他可比之處：我們比鄰居幹得好嗎？當我們不再想着蛋糕做多大的時候，我們開始彼此爭搶更大的份額。許多投票支持退歐的人沒有將歐盟成員國身份視爲一個有着共同利益的合作項目，而是認爲它是一個英國輸、布魯塞爾贏的零和遊戲。

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……

Economists are naturally inclined to see the world as a place where everyone can prosper. The Trumpish rhetoric of winners and losers is alien — and alarming — to us. But that is the world in which we now live. The economics of Brexit are daunting but, with goodwill on all sides, they are manageable. It is the zero-sum politics that worry me.

經濟學家們自然傾向於認爲，世界上每一個人都能夠獲得成功。特朗普式的贏家和輸家論讓我們感到陌生，而且也令人警惕。但這就是我們現在所處的世界。退歐的經濟影響令人生畏，但由於各方都出於善意，它們是可管理的。真正讓我擔心的是零和政治。

It would be wrong to suggest that economic suffering inevitably produces a backlash. In the UK, the people who have struggled most since the crisis have been the young — and, in a sadly inspiring act, they were the ones who voted overwhelmingly to stay in the EU.

有人會說，經濟困難必然引發抵制情緒，這種觀點是錯誤的。在英國，自金融危機以來日子最艱難的一直是年輕人，可也正是這些年輕人堅決投票留在歐盟，真是令人遺憾又感到振奮。

Still, the economic backdrop clearly matters, both in its own right and because of its political effects. Those of us who are committed to openness and prosperity for everyone, regardless of their nationality, now have a long campaign on our hands. We should start by accepting that, if we cannot bring back broad-based and growing prosperity to the advanced economies, Brexit will not be the last political shock we must face.

然而，經濟背景顯然至關重要，無論是從其自身還是其政治影響來說均是如此。我們當中致力於讓所有人（無論國籍）享受開放和繁榮的那些人現在要開展一項曠日持久的運動。我們首先應該認識到，如果我們不能在發達經濟體恢復廣泛和持續的繁榮，英國退歐就不會是我們必須面對的最後的政治衝擊。