雙語暢銷書《艾倫圖靈傳》第7章:運轉起來(4)
All the time, while minds and technology were being pushed to the limit at Bletchley in the attack on German signals, the most elementary blunders were being made in the defence of their own.
The result was that since late 1941, the German successes had been owed not only to the growing numerical strength of the U-boat fleet, but to their knowledge of Allied convoy routes;
這導致的結果是，自從1941末以來，德國的成功不僅是因爲U艇數量的增長，還因爲對盟軍護航路線瞭如指掌。and during 1942 the effect of the Enigma blackout was only half the story.
在1942年期間，謎機破譯工作中斷所造成的影響，只是故事一半。
Unlike the German authorities, the British were capable of recognising a mistake.
但與德國當局不同，英國能夠立即認識到錯誤。The error was not that of the Admiralty alone, for GC and CS had exercised that part of its remit which called it to advise upon cipher security.
錯誤不只在於海軍，因爲有一部分密碼安全工作已經移交給了政密學校，But it was a part of GC and CS which had been left untouched by the revolutions elsewhere, and whose timescale still ran in terms of years.
但政密學校並沒有像重視破譯德軍密碼那樣，來重視這些防守性工作，因此這方面的進展很遲緩。In 1941 it had devised a new system, which in 1942 the Admiralty had agreed to introduce in June 1943.
他們到1941年才設計出新的通信系統，而海軍直到1942年才批准他們於1943年6月引入使用。Even allowing for the fact that it took six months simply to equip the Navy with new tables, this was a story of delays normal in peacetime, but bearing no connection with the new standards applied to anything considered essential for the war.
他們甚至連批准更換新的密碼手冊都需要花上六個月。這種拖延，在和平時期還算有情可原，但在戰爭的生死關頭，就顯得很沒道理。If it were the decipherment of exciting messages, or airborne radar to make German cities visible for night raids, or the atomic bomb, then new industries could be conjured up in months.
信息破譯戰、使德國夜如白晝的空中雷達，還有原子彈，這些工作很刺激，它們可以通過新型的工業技術，在幾個月內像變魔術一樣拿出來。The less glamorous work of convoy protection called forth no such effort.
但是護航保衛工作卻不怎麼刺激，無法激起這樣的勁頭。
